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Abstract
This paper studies whether countries benefit from servicing their debts during times of
widespread sovereign defaults. Colombia is typically regarded as the only large Latin
American country that did not default in the 1980s. Using archival research and formal
econometric estimates of Colombia’s probability of default, we show that in the early 1980s
Colombia’s fundamentals were not significantly different from those of the Latin American
countries that defaulted on their debts. We also document that the different path chosen
by Colombia was due to the authorities’ belief that maintaining a good reputation in the
international capital market would have substantial long-term payoffs. We show that the
case of Colombia is more complex than what it is commonly assumed. Although Colombia
had to re-profile its debts, high-level political support from the US allowed Colombia do
to so outside the standard framework of an IMF program. Our counterfactual analysis
shows that in the short to medium run, Colombia benefited from avoiding an explicit
default. Specifically, we find that GDP growth in the 1980s was higher than that of a
counterfactual in which Colombia behaved like its neighboring countries. We also test
whether Colombia’s behavior in the 1980s led to long-term reputational benefits. Using
an event study based on a large sudden stop, we find no evidence for such long-lasting
reputational gains.
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1 Non-Technical Summary
In the case of sovereign debt, creditor rights are not as well defined for private debts. This is
due to essentially two reasons. First, most sovereign assets are located within the borrower’s
jurisdiction and the borrower cannot credibly commit to hand over these assets in case of
default. Second, there are legal principles that protect sovereign assets, even when they are
located in foreign jurisdictions (sovereign immunity has however been eroded in recent years,
see Schumacher, Trebesch, and Enderlein, 2018).
Starting from these considerations, the economic literature on sovereign debt has focused
on the incentives to repay that sustain the market for sovereign debt when enforcement is
weak. The main insight of this literature is that, given that countries cannot be forced to
repay, they will do so only if they think that the actual cost of paying is lower than the
expected cost of not repaying (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981). As creditors will only lend if they
expect that debtor countries will likely repay, the expected costs of default are what makes
sovereign debt possible. Empirical work on the costs of sovereign default has mostly focused
on reputation in the international capital market and GDP growth. These are also the main
indicators used to proxy the cost of default in quantitative models of sovereign debt (Arellano,
2008).
The results of the empirical literature that tests for reputational effects are mixed. Several
authors find that the negative consequences of sovereign defaults on the terms of access to the
international capital market are either short lived or small (see, among others, Eichengreen
and Portes, 1986, Borensztein and Panizza, 2010, Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris, 2011). Cruces
and Trebesch (2011) show that, although these results hold for the average defaulter, the
reputational costs of default are increasing with the haircut imposed on creditors. Catao
and Mano (2017), on the contrary, find that defaulters pay a large and long-lived premium,
irrespective of the size of the haircut.
There are also mixed results in the empirical literature that focuses on the output costs of
default. Cross-country regressions suggest that defaults are associated with a short-term de-
crease in GDP growth of approximately 2 percentage points (Sturzenegger, 2004, Borensztein
and Panizza, 2010, De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta, 2009, and Esteves, Kelly, and Lennard,
2021).
Rather than looking at the cost of default, this paper studies the benefits of repaying
during times of widespread default. We focus on the case of Colombia, the only large Latin
American country that is generally deemed as not having defaulted in the 1980s.
In the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , we expect that reputational gains in the
international capital markets should be higher if a country shows willingness to service its
debts when faced with a very large negative shock. For example, Tomz (2012) argues that
this is exactly the reason why during the 1930’s the Argentinean Minister of Finance Alberto
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Hueyo insisted that Argentina continued servicing its debt. Similarly, in our case the lead
debt negotiator for Colombia in the 1980s emphasized that maintaining the role of “good
debtor” and being an exceptional case in Latin America and in most of the developing world
could improve Colombia’s future market access (Garay, 1991, p. 86.).
While Colombia is normally classified as a country that did not default in the 1980s, in
fact the country went through four rounds of debt rescheduling, with conditions which were
only slightly more favorable to creditors than the conditions applied by other Latin American
countries that are normally classified as defaulters. Indeed, following these rescheduling,
Colombia’s syndicated bank loans were trading in the secondary market at a large discount.
The binary classifications of default/non default typically employed in the empirical literature
fails to capture these events. In the paper we conduct an extensive research of the IMF
archives regarding the Latin American default crisis of the 1980s. This shows that that
Colombia’s main differences with other countries in the region were more of a political rather
than economic nature. On the one hand, Colombia’s fundamentals in the early 1980s were
very similar to those of its neighboring (defaulting) countries, suggesting that its “ability
to pay” was not significantly different. On the other hand, historical research shows that
the Colombian authorities had a clear willingness to maintain a good relationship with their
creditors. For this reason, they strived and managed to avoid a formal restructuring agreement
within an IMF program but were able to obtain the Fund’s consensus to play an informal role
of external guarantor. This was only made possible by the strong political support from the
US administration and the US Federal Reserve.
In our empirical analysis we try to measure the short- and long-term benefits from repay-
ing. We find that in the aftermath of the Latin American defaults, by not explicitly defaulting
Colombia enjoyed significant economic benefits. However, we also find that Colombia’s im-
proved reputation in the international capital market was not long lived.
Taken together, our results support the view that it may be misleading to treat default
episodes as binary events (Meyer, Reinhart, and Trebesch, 2019) and that more research is
needed to understand the short and long-term economic effects of different debt rescheduling
strategies.
2 Introduction
A defining characteristic of sovereign debt is its limited enforceability. Moving from this con-
sideration, the economic literature focuses on the incentives to repay that sustain a burgeoning
market for sovereign debt. Building on a seminal paper by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), the
general message of the literature is that, given that sovereigns cannot be forced to repay, they
will do so only if the actual cost of paying is lower than the expected costs of default. As
creditors will only lend if they think that debtors will repay, the costs of default are what
3
makes sovereign debt possible (Dooley, 2000).
Empirical work on the costs of sovereign default has focused on studying the consequences
of not repaying on several economic outcomes, such as access to the international capital
market, GDP growth, and international trade. These variables proxy for the different “pun-
ishment” mechanisms emphasized by the theoretical literature.1
In this paper, we take a different approach. We study the benefits of repaying during times
of widespread default. We focus on the case of Colombia, the only large Latin American coun-
try that is generally deemed as not having defaulted in the 1980s.2 We find that Colombia
enjoyed short-term benefits from not defaulting but that it did not gain any long-term advan-
tage in terms of reputation with international creditors. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper which evaluates, using both archival research and formal econometric tech-
niques, the potential benefits of repaying amidst widespread sovereign default in neighboring
countries.
Studying the benefits of repaying when everybody else defaults only makes sense if the
economic situation of the country under examination is similar to that of the countries that
defaulted. In the first part of our analysis, we show that in the early 1980s Colombia’s
fundamentals were not significantly different from those of the Latin American countries that
defaulted on their debts. We also document that the different path chosen by Colombia was
due to the authorities’ belief that maintaining a good reputation in the international capital
market would have substantial long-term payoffs.3
Archival research also shows that the case of Colombia is more complex than what it is
commonly assumed. Although Colombia had to re-profile its debts, the Colombian authori-
ties wanted to stand out from the rest of Latin America by avoiding at all costs official debt
rescheduling under an IMF program.4 Recently declassified documents reveal that the Colom-
bian authorities were able to achieve this objective thanks to high-level political support from
both the US administration, which saw Colombia as a key ally in the war on drugs, and the
US Federal Reserve, which wished to demonstrate that it was not using a cookie-cutter ap-
1Besides Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), seminal theoretical contributions in this literature include Bulow and
Rogoff (1989a), Bulow and Rogoff (1989b), Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990), Kletzer (1994), Sachs and Cohen
(1982), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Cole and Kehoe (1995), and Cole and Kehoe (1998). For surveys and a
quantitative assessments of the various models, see Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017), Tomz and Wright (2013),
and Aguiar and Amador (2014).
2Unlike most empirical papers that consider Colombia as not having defaulted in the 1980s, Beers, Jones, and
Walsh (2020) reports Colombia as being in default for most of the 1980s and 1990s.
3Junguito (1985) and Garay (1991) provide a detailed description of the views of the Colombian authorities.
The latter also mentions that Colombia’s strategy was aimed at avoiding the nationalization of the external
debt of the the Colombian private sector. This strategy was not fully successfully as the Colombian government
had to take over the external debt of Banco de Colombia.
4Throughout the paper we often use the terms “rescheduling” and “reprofiling” interchangeably, but more
precisely Colombia’s strategy was to issue new debt to refinance its maturing debt. Hence, strictly speaking,
it did not reschedule its debt. However, the new debt issuance was never fully voluntarily bought and hence
Colombia’s strategy was de facto equivalent to a rescheduling (Garay, 1991).
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proach in the rescheduling of Latin American debts. The minutes of a key IMF Board meeting
demonstrate that most IMF directors had strong reservations against Colombia’s request for a
shadow program and that Colombia’s preferred strategy was only approved becuase of strong
support from the United States.
Next, we use synthetic control (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) and synthetic difference-
in-differences (Arkhangelsky, Athey, Hirshberg, Imbens, and Wager, 2020) to assess whether
Colombia’s decision to avoid a formal debt rescheduling had a short and medium-term impact
on GDP growth and macroeconomic stability. We find that Colombia did better in terms
of output growth with respect to a counterfactual in which it behaved like its neighboring
countries. Our results are in line with those of Trebesch and Zabel (2017) and Asonuma
and Trebesch (2016) who find that conflictual and long-lasting restructuring processes are
associated with larger output losses.
Theoretical work in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) postulates that willingness
to repay is driven by the desire to maintain reputation in the international capital markets.5
Presumably, reputational gains should be higher if a country shows willingness to service
its debts when faced with a very large negative shock. According to Tomz (2012), this is
exactly why the Argentinean Minister of Finance Alberto Hueyo argued that it was key that
Argentina continued servicing its debt in the 1930s. In his words, “To fulfill one’s contracted
obligations is extremely honorable, but to do so when everyone is defaulting and in times of
crisis is a thousand times more valuable.” (quoted in Tomz, 2012, p. 177). Along similar lines,
the lead debt negotiator for Colombia in the 1980s emphasized that maintaining the role of
“good debtor” and being an exceptional case in Latin America and in most of the developing
world could improve Colombia’s future market access (Garay, 1991, p. 86.)
To test this idea, we use the sudden stop episode that followed the Russian default of Au-
gust 1998 to assess whether the good reputation gained in the early 1980s improved Colombia’s
market access during a deep crisis.6 Our event study shows no evidence in support of the
hypothesis that Colombia’s behavior in the 1980s had a long-lasting reputational payoff. If
anything, we find that in the aftermath of the Russian default, Colombian spreads increased
faster than those of other Latin American countries that defaulted in the 1980s.
We offer two possible interpretations for this result. The first is simply that reputation
is short-lived. The second interpretation is that investors saw through what happened in the
1980s and realized that, while Colombia is normally classified as a non-defaulter, it did receive
debt treatments which were similar to those of the countries who explicitly defaulted in the
5Two main lines of criticism to theoretical models in the spirits of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) are that the
threat of permanent exclusion from future lending is not credible (Kletzer, 1994) and that debtor could use
alternative methods to smooth consumption over the business cycle (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a).
6Note that we cannot use the “Tequila” crisis of December 1994 because data on spreads for Colombia are only
available from mid-1997 . Similarly, lack of data also prevents us from conducting event studies around the
Asian Financial crisis. Moreover, unlike the Russian default episode, the Tequila crisis originated within Latin
America and hence was not a pure external financial shock.
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1980s.7 This latter interpretation is problematic for both the empirical and the theoretical
sovereign default literature. It is problematic for the empirical literature because it suggests
that the standard binary measures used to evaluate the event of a sovereign default are too
rough (this is also a key conclusion of Meyer, Reinhart, and Trebesch, 2019). If Colombia in
the 1980s is misclassified, other countries may also be misclassified.
It is also problematic for the theoretical literature which assumes that the decision on
whether to default or not is made by a social planner who weighs the costs of defaulting
against those of repaying. Defaults are thus strategic and driven by “willingness” to pay. Our
archival research shows that the Colombian authorities did everything they could to remain
current on their debts and to be as creditor friendly as possible. If we were to consider
Colombia’s debt rescheduling in the 1980s as a default episode, we would need to conclude
that this was a clear case of inability to pay rather than a case of unwillingness to pay, as
it is normally assumed in the economic literature.8 It is also worth noting that, while the
Colombian authorities insisted on being a good debtor in order to preserve reputation in
the international capital markets, quantitative models of sovereign debt show that reputation
plays a negligible role in sustaining realistic debt levels.9
Our paper is closely related to three strands of the empirical literature on sovereign default.
The first strand focuses on empirical models aimed at predicting debt crises and at assessing
the timing of default (for a survey, see Claessens, Kose, Laeven, and Valencia, 2014). Here,
we build on work by Manasse, Schimmelpfennig, and Roubini (2003), Manasse and Roubini
(2009), and, following Manasse, Savona, and Vezzoli (2016), Fioramanti (2008), Savona and
Vezzoli (2015), and Moreno Badia, Medas, Gupta, and Xiang (2020), use machine learning
techniques to select a parsimonious set of predictors. Our work is also related to Tomz and
Wright (2007) and Gelpern and Panizza (2021) who study whether countries always default
in “bad times.”
The second strand of literature to which we contribute focuses on the short-term macroe-
conomic effects of default. Cross-country regressions suggest that defaults are associated with
a short-term decrease in GDP growth of approximately 2 percentage points (Sturzenegger,
2004, Borensztein and Panizza, 2009, De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta, 2009, Jorra, 2011,
7We would like to thank Michel Habib for suggesting this interpretation. Note that if Colombia had been rated
in the 1980s, rating agencies would have classified the various debt reschedulings described by Garay (1991)
as default events (Beers and Chambers, 2006).
8Borensztein, Levy Yeyati, and Panizza (2006) and IMF (2013) suggest that these considerations apply to many
other defaults. For a discussion of debt crises without default, see, instead, Mitchener and Trebesch (2021)
9Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017) point out that while “quintessential element of the Eaton-Gersovitz model
is that default is punished by exclusion from international credit markets” (p. 536), “exclusion from credit
markets plays a negligible role for the quantitative performance of the Eaton-Gersovitz model. The main
mechanism supporting debt in equilibrium is the output loss associated with default.” (p.538). This implicitly
suggest that the model does not require policymakers with a long-term horizon. Collard, Habib, and Rochet
(2015) provide an alternative modelling strategy which focuses on inability to pay.
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Kuvshinov and Zimmermann, 2019 and Esteves, Kelly, and Lennard, 2021).10 Output costs
of 2-3% are standard in calibrated models of sovereign debt and default (e.g., Arellano, 2008).
One problem with these cross-country studies relates to the fact that defaults tend to happen
in period of low growth. Levy Yeyati and Panizza (2011) try to address this issue by using
higher frequency data. They find that output collapses tend to precede defaults and that
output starts growing after the quarter in which the default took place. Estimating the link
between default and growth is also complicated by the fact that the type of debt restructuring
matters. For example, less conflictual restructuring processes and “decisive” debt restructur-
ings tend to have lower output costs (Trebesch and Zabel, 2017, Asonuma and Trebesch, 2016,
Reinhart and Trebesch, 2016, and Asonuma, Chamon, Erce, and Sasahara, 2019).
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the reputational costs of sovereign default.
As mentioned, a central idea in the sovereign debt literature is that willingness to repay is
driven by the desire to maintain reputation in the international capital markets (Eaton and
Gersovitz, 1981). However, the results of the empirical literature are mixed. While there is
evidence of capital market exclusion in the immediate aftermath of a default, most countries
regain access rather quickly (Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris, 2011), with global credit cycles being
a more important determinant of access than individual default episodes (Panizza, Sturzeneg-
ger, and Zettelmeyer, 2009).11 Focusing on borrowing costs, Borensztein and Panizza (2009)
find short-lived effects for a set of recent default episodes and Flandreau and Zumer (2004)
find that similar results hold for the Gold Standard period.12 However, Ozler (1993) finds that
countries that defaulted in the 1930s or in the postwar period faced slightly higher spreads in
the 1970s, Catão and Mano (2017) find that the costs of default are persistent, and Cruces and
Trebesch (2013) show that post default spreads increase with the size of the haircut imposed
on creditors. Covering more than 200 years of data Meyer, Reinhart, and Trebesch (2019)
show that bonds issued by serial defaulters have positive ex-post excess returns. However, it
is not clear whether these higher spreads are driven by default history or by a third factor
which contemporaneously affects spreads and the probability of default.
The two studies which are closest to ours are Tomz (2012) and Jorgensen and Sachs’s
(1989) analyses of Argentina’s behavior in the 1930s. The former suggests that that Ar-
gentina obtained reputational gains from not defaulting in the 1930s, the latter concludes
that “when the countries returned to the international capital markets in the 1950s, no ap-
parent systematic difference between defaulters and nondefaulters emerges” (p. 79). While
these authors reach opposite conclusions, they do not provide any formal test. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to formally test Minister Hueyo and the Colombian authorities’
10Note that these short-term effects on GDP growth can have long-term effects on output levels.
11Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2002) show that global factors were more important in the 1990s than during the
Gold Standard.
12Focusing on the same period, Esteves and Jalles (2016) find long-lived effects of sovereign default on private
sector access to the international capital market.
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belief that repaying when everybody else defaults can yield large reputational gains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 briefly describes the evolution and
resolution of the Latin American Debt crisis and then describes the results of our archival
research on the case of Colombia’s “non-default.” Section 4 estimates Colombia’s default
probability in the 1980s and compares it with the estimated default probabilities of actual
defaulters. Section 5 builds a counterfactual analysis aimed at estimating what would have
happened to Colombia’s GDP, inflation, and trade balance if the country had behaved like
its Latin American neighbors. Section 6 uses an event study to estimate whether Colombia
obtained long-term reputational benefits by being especially creditor-friendly in the 1980s.
Section 7 concludes.
3 Sovereign Debt Re-negotiations in the 1980s: Colombia and
the Rest of Latin America
In the 1970s, many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean experienced rapid GDP
growth and large current account deficits financed with loans by international banks (espe-
cially, large US money-center banks) which were reinvesting the surpluses accumulated by oil
exporting countries in the Middle East. Total outstanding debt of Latin American borrowers
went from less than $30 billion in 1970 to more than $320 billion in 1982. In the same year,
outstanding loans to developing countries by the largest nine US banks were nearly three
times the capital of these banks, and loans to Latin America were close to 180% of the banks’
capital (Sachs, 1988). Most of these loans were in US dollars with a floating interest rate
linked to US short-term rates. When anti-inflationary policies in the United States and other
advanced economies led to a large and rapid increase in nominal interest rates, a strong ap-
preciation of the dollar, a global recession, and tighter financing conditions from global banks,
developing countries started facing problems servicing their debts.
The beginning of the Latin American debt crisis is usually associated with the weekend
of August 13-15, 1982, when, after closing the country’s foreign exchange market, Mexican
finance minister Jesùs Silva Herzog traveled to Washington to inform the International Mon-
etary Fund and the US Treasury that Mexico was no longer able to service its $86 billion of
external debt (Boughton, 2001, and Truman, 2020).13
Mexico was soon followed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and several other countries
in Africa, Asia, and Europe. In total, 26 countries “defaulted” between 1982 and 1983 and
other 29 in the rest of the 1980s (Table A1 in the Appendix). Latin America and the Caribbean
was the most severely affected region. Out of the region’s 23 countries with more than one
13Boughton (2001), p. 289-284, provides details of the events and negotiations during what become to be known
as the “Mexican weekend.”
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million inhabitants, 22 “defaulted” between 1980 and 1989.14 Colombia was the only large
Latin American country that did not “default” in this period.
We used quotation marks around the word default because, while empirical research on
sovereign debt labels these events as default episodes, default is rarely a binary process. Most
of the countries listed above continued servicing their debts until the Brady exchanges of
the late 1980s. However, debt service was only possible because these countries had entered
formal debt rescheduling agreements coordinated by the official sector. As these rescheduling
agreements often implied large net present value (NPV) losses for the creditors, these countries
were in de facto default.15 Nevertheless, bankers and the international community maintained
that countries were not in default, in order to prevent write-downs which would have wiped
out the capital of several large financial institutions (Sachs and Huizinga, 1987).16
Only after bank balance sheets had been repaired in the late 1980s, it became possible to
acknowledge the default and proceed to a face value debt reduction through the Brady plan.
In this respect, Colombia was different, because it never entered any official rescheduling
framework. It is worth noting that rating agencies consider any debt exchange, including
consensual ones, that results in less favorable terms for the creditors as a default event (Beers
and Chambers, 2006). Hence, all the exchanges that we describe below (including those of
Colombia) would have been classified as default episodes had the Latin American issuers that
we study been rated in the 1980s.
3.1 The Three Phases of the Latin American Debt Crisis
Broadly speaking, the debt crisis had three phases (Truman, 2020, Cline, 1995, and Devlin
and Ffrench-Davis, 1994).17
The first phase (1982-85) was characterized by the predominant view that the crisis was
due to temporary liquidity problems (Cline, 1984). The consensus was that fiscal adjustment
and coordinated reprofiling of principal repayments (conditional on IMF programs) would
14The list includes four small countries in the region that defaulted before Mexico. Bolivia and Nicaragua
defaulted in 1980 and Honduras and Jamaica in 1980. There were also many defaults in Sub-Saharan Africa,
but in this case “only” 50% of countries defaulted. The number of defaults was instead low in East Asia,
Emerging Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa. Specifically, there were two defaults in East Asia
(The Philippines and Vietnam), four in Emerging Europe (Poland, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia), and
four in the Middle East and North Africa (Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen).
15The fact that rescheduling implied NPV losses for the creditor is confirmed by the observation that, in the
secondary market, the loans to Latin American countries traded at a large discount. Note that banks were
able to sell part of their loans at a discount without booking large losses in their balance sheets. This was
accomplished by putting a small part of the loans in segregated accounts which were marked-to-market, while
the remaining part was evaluated at face value. Some of the loans acquired at a discount were then used for
debt-to-equity swaps.
16The fact that bankers formed “advisory” committee rather than “debtor’s” committee was part of the pretense
that debt was not in default.
17Note that Table 6.1 of Boughton (2001) lists 5 overlapping stages: (i) Onset, 1981-82; (ii) Concerted lending,
1982-86; (iii) Multiyear rescheduling arrangements (MYRA) and enhanced surveillance, 1984-85; (iv) Experi-
mentation, 1985-88; and (v) Debt relief, 1989.
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allow countries to stay current on interest payments.18 The fiscal adjustment led to a quick
turnaround in the current account which, in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean,
went from a 5% deficit in terms of the region’s GDP in 1982, to a surplus of nearly 1% in
1984. During this phase, there were three rounds of negotiations.
The first round focused on concerted lending by commercial banks which operated in close
cooperation with the IMF (Boughton, 2001). The new terms of the loan contracts settled on
spreads over the LIBOR of about 2%-2.5%, maturities of 6-8 years, and required the payment
of large upfront cash commissions. These terms were almost identical across borrowers (Diaz-
Alejandro, 1984, see also Table A2 in the Appendix). Devlin and Ffrench-Davis (1994) show
that these conditions led to a steep increase in debt servicing costs. A second round of
negotiations led to a slight reduction in the cost of credit and a third round in 1984 pushed
the cost of credit below the pre-crisis level.19 Taken together, the restructuring of the first
phase led to an increase in the present value of developing countries debt. Concerted lending
also led to complicated interactions between creditor banks and the IMF, especially in the
case of small countries (Boughton, 2001 p. 405-409.)
The second phase (1985-89) was opened in 1985 by US Treasury Secretary James Baker’s
announcement of a new US approach to the Latin American debt crisis (hence, the “Baker
Plan”). The Baker Plan shared some features with the first phase but it also involved com-
mitments to substantial amounts of “new” money from both the private and official sectors.
It also led to a greater involvement of the World Bank and of the regional development banks.
Restructurings under the Baker plan had financial conditions which were much softer than
those applied in previous rounds. Spreads over LIBOR were lowered to the order of 0.8%-0.9%,
amortization periods were extended, and there were no commissions.20
Until 1987, there was no official support for debt relief in the form of a reduction in the
face value of bank loans. However, in 1987, departing IMF Managing Director Jacques de
Larosière suggested that banks may need to change their strategy, and that “the reality of
the marketplace may well have to be taken into account by the banks to ensure the success of
future financing packages and the maintenance of solidarity among the financial community”
(IMF, 1987b). A first timid step in this direction became known as the “market-based menu
approach,” consisting of debt buybacks, exit bonds, and debt swaps (Bouchet and Jonathan,
18Coordination took place through the creation of the aforementioned “advisory committees.” These were
usually led by the banks with the largest exposure in any given country, with the International Monetary Fund
coordinating talks between debtor countries and the advisory committees.
19Devlin and Ffrench-Davis (1994) build an index of the composite cost of credit which equals to 100 in 1981.
After the first round, the index ranged between 144 (Brazil) and 349 (Uruguay). During the the second round,
it ranged between 93 (Chile) and 160 (Mexico). It dropped to between 43 (Brazil) and 114 (Argentina) in the
third round.
20In this wave of restructurings, the Devlin and Ffrench-Davis (1994) index of the composite cost of credit was
always below 100 and ranged between 40 (Argentina) and 50 (Chile). Besides lower spreads, the reduction in
the cost of credit was also due to the fact that the base rate changed from the US prime rate to the LIBOR,
with the latter being 100-150 basis points lower than the former.
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1989 and Lamdany, 1989).21 Through these exchanges, via lower interest rates and extended
maturities, the second phase led to a modest reduction in the present value of developing
countries’ debts.
Contrary to the first two phases, the third phase, announced by US Treasury Secretary
Nicholas Brady in March 1989, focused on debt reduction with direct financial support from
the official sector. The Brady plan envisioned a transformation of defaulted bank loans into
collateralized bonds. It included four key elements (Truman, 2020): (i) the use of zero-coupon
US Treasury bonds to collateralize the newly issued bonds (the purchase of these bonds was
financed with loans from the international financial institutions and bilateral lenders); (ii) the
continuation of debt buybacks; (iii) the waiving by commercial banks of legal clauses that
hampered debt restructuring (for example “negative pledge” clauses which limited the bond
issuers’ ability to pledge collateral to secure new debt); and (iv) a change in the IMF policy
that prevented the Fund from lending into arrears.22
Over the period 1990-1998, 11 countries implemented Brady exchanges. The launch of
the Brady plan marks the beginning of the end of the 1980s debt crisis. It also helped that,
by the early 1990s, growth had picked up, global financial conditions had eased, and many
emerging market countries had regained access to the international financial market. This
time, not through syndicated bank loans, but with the issuance of global bonds.
3.2 The Strange Case of Colombia’s Non-Default
Colombia’s exceptionalism in terms of being the only country in Latin America and the
Caribbean that did not default is not associated with either especially favorable economic
performance or sound fiscal and external indicators in the early 1980s. During the coffee
bonanza of 1975-78, President Alfonso López adopted conservative macroeconomic policies
which led to a reduction of external debt. However, the administration of President Julio
César Turbay (1978-82) ran large fiscal and external deficits, leading to a substantial increase
of Colombia’s debt ratios. Ocampo (1989) describes this latter period as the “latinamerican-
ization” of the Colombian economy (see also Ocampo, 2015).23
A comparison of Colombia with other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
along five standard macroeconomic and debt indicators shows that in the run-up to the crisis
Colombia was better positioned than the median country in the region. However, it was
21Helpman (1989) provides a theoretical discussion of voluntary debt reductions. Seminal papers on debt over-
hang are Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1989).
22The Brady Plan was preceded by an exchange offer launched by Mexico and led by JP Morgan. The bonds
issued with this exchange became known as “Aztec Bonds.” The principal of the Aztec Bonds was collateralized
with zero coupon bonds similar to those used in the Brady exchanges. However, unlike the Bradies, they did
not include collateral for interest payments.
23The adjustment to the crisis was in two stages: a weaker adjustment which worsened the imbalances over
1982-83 and a stronger adjustment over 1984-85 (see Ocampo, 1989, and chapter 3 of Ocampo, 2015).
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never the best performer.24 Focusing on the external debt-to-GDP ratio in 1981, there were
four countries with debt levels lower than that of Colombia and two large countries (Mexico
and Brazil) with debt levels only slightly higher than Colombia (6 percentage points of GDP
higher in the case of Mexico and 8 points in the case of Brazil). Hence, while Colombia had
adopted more prudent external debt policies than other countries in the previous years (Diaz-
Alejandro, 1984, Ocampo and Lora, 1988, Ocampo, 1989, and Cline, 1995), in 1981 its level
of external debt was not significantly lower than that of some defaulting countries. In the
case of the primary fiscal balance, over 1978-81, Colombia was close to the region’s median
level. The same applies to the rate of GDP growth and inflation. In terms of the current
account, Colombia was in a better position relative to the region’s median, but also in this
case, Colombia was not among the top four performers in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The fact that Colombia was not in an exceptionally favorable situation in the run-up to the
debt crisis was also reflected in its cost of borrowing. Colombia’s interest spread over the US
prime rate was a bit higher than those of Venezuela and Mexico and just below those of Chile
and Ecuador.25
Two dimensions along which Colombia entered the crisis in a more favorable position with
respect to the other large Latin American economies are the stock of international reserves and
the composition of external debt. In 1981-82, Colombia had a reserves-to-imports ratio which
was about 2.5 times the average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela
(about 9 months versus 3.5 months). However, Colombian reserves dropped rapidly. By
1983, the Colombian reserves-to-imports ratio was similar to the regional average and in 1984
it became lower than the regional average (3 months versus 5 months), with Argentina being
the only large country in the region with a lower reserves-to-import ratio (the same holds
if we focus on reserves over external debt). With respect to the composition of external
debt, Colombia had lower levels of debt with private creditors and higher levels of debt with
official creditors (especially the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, see
Junguito, 1985, and Garay, 1991).
Like in other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the economic situation of
Colombia deteriorated in the first half of the 1980s. In particular, during 1982-83 net cap-
ital inflows collapsed, although to a lesser extent compared to other large Latin American
economies (Diaz-Alejandro, 1984, and Ocampo, 2015). From the second half of 1982, Colom-
bia was unable to access the international capital market (Garay, 1991).26
The Colombian balance of payment, after registering surpluses of about 3% of GDP over
24The differences between Colombia’s fundamentals and the Region’s average were never statistically significant
(Table A3 in the Appendix).
25For a discussion of borrowing costs before the Latin American debt crisis see Rockerbie (1993) and Altamura
and Flores Zendejas (2020).
26Financial contagion might have played a role. In the words of Diaz-Alejandro (1984), p. 389: “A popular story
alleges that banks forced to lend to Brazil and Mexico, but facing self-imposed, arbitrary lending ceilings to
Latin America as a whole, simply cut back lending to Colombia.”
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the period 1976-80, deteriorated to a zero balance in 1981, when a rapid increase in imports
and a decline in coffee exports led to a four percentage points increase of the current account
deficit, which was mostly financed by private capital inflows (IMF, 1982). Economic con-
ditions deteriorated rapidly in 1982 when stagnating exports, together with higher imports,
pushed the current account deficit to 10% of GDP (Table A4). Tighter international financial
conditions did not allow Colombia to fully finance this growing current account deficit and
pushed the balance of payment into deficit for the first time in more than six years, leading
to a 15% drop in international reserves.
In the second half of 1982, the Central Bank had to extend emergency assistance to the
financial sector, providing liquidity to nine financial institutions. Together with the continuous
monetization of the government deficit (which had increased from 2.5% of GDP in 1980 to
7.6% in 1982), these policies led to a substantial expansion of the balance sheet of the central
bank (IMF, 1983). At the end of 1982, the further deterioration of the economic situation
led the government to declare a 5-day state of economic emergency, under which drastic
policy measures targeted to raise tax revenues and to cut transfers to local governments were
imposed. However, most of the measures implemented in these five days were invalidated by
the Supreme Court (IMF, 1983).
During the 1983 Article IV consultation with the IMF, the Colombian authorities ex-
pressed concerns about reserve losses in 1983. The authorities feared that if reserves dropped
by more than $1 billion there could be widespread market panic (IMF, 1983). In 1983, reserves
fell by even more, with a total loss of $1.6 billion (from $4.9 to $3.3 billion), and with debt
service absorbing nearly 40% of export revenues (up from 15% in 1980). Reserves dropped
again, by $1.6 billion, in 1984. In total, Colombia lost two thirds of its reserves over a period
of two years (from $4.9 billion in 1982 to $1.7 billion in 1984).
By mid-1984, it had become clear that Colombia was unable to service its external debt.
However, rather than suspending its payments like the rest of its Latin American neighbors,
Colombia opted for negotiating with its foreign creditors a series of arrangements that would
refinance the majority of payments coming due between 1985 and 1994. Even though partic-
ipation in these exchanges was not voluntary, the Colombian authorities strove to maintain
their reputation of “good debtor” in the international capital market (Garay, 1991). In the
words of IMF staff:
Colombia external debt strategy has been to achieve a return to normal access to
international capital markets. Consistent with this strategy, the authorities have
avoided a formal debt rescheduling and have tried to maintain the exposure of
commercial banks and multilateral institutions to Colombia that roughly match
amortizations payment as they fall due. (IMF, 1989 pages 39-41)
Over the period 1985-1990, the Colombian authorities negotiated 4 of such arrangements:
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Table 1: Colombia’s Debt Renegotiations
Date and
Name





$1 billion $515 mill. planned
for 1985 $485 mill.
planned for 1986,
but all disbursed in
1986
3.4 years LIBOR +150 bps














of payments due to
banks in 1987-88)
Planned for 1987-
88, but only signed
and disbursed in
1988




10 years. Authorities had







































& facility of $200
million. (corre-




1991-94 6.2 years LIBOR+100







Source: IMF Article IV 1988, 1989, 1991, and Garay (1991)
the “Jumbo” arrangement of 1985 ($1 billion); the “Concorde” arrangement of 1987 ($1
billion); the “Challenger” arrangement of 1989 ($1.5 billion), and the “Hercules” arrangement
of 1991 ($1.8 billion).27 These arrangements had maturities ranging between 9 and 12 years,
grace periods ranging between 3.4 and 6.2 years, and spreads over LIBOR ranging between 87
and 150 basis points. However, effective average costs reached 193 basis points over LIBOR
(Table 1) These conditions were substantially worse than the average interest rate in 1982,
which was 1.1% over LIBOR. While none of these arrangements were fully voluntary, Garay
(1991) claims that participation in the Concorde and Challenger loans was semi-voluntary,
while in the Hercules loan, commercial bank were more willing to participate. In 1984, the
Colombian authorities also set rescheduling parameters for non-financial private sector firms
that were unable to service their external debt.28
The fact that between 1987 and 1990, Colombian loans traded in the secondary market at
prices that ranged between 58 and 64 cents on the dollar, demonstrates that these conditions
implied significant NPV losses for the lenders (see Table 2). However, secondary market val-
uations of Colombian loans were the highest in the region during the 1980’s, and were only
second to Chile in the first half of the 1990’s, outperforming valuations of Argentinian, Brazil-
ian, and Venezuelan loans, not to mention Peru’s.29 According to some in the opposition,
27Debt contracted with bilateral creditors and with Spanish and German banks to finance the construction of
the metropolitan train in Medellin was also rescheduled.
28Central Bank’s Resolution 33 stated that, in order to obtain liquidity support, non-financial firms had to obtain
a rescheduling agreement with a minimum of 6 years including a 3-year grace period and a maximum interest
spread over LIBOR of 2.5%.
29Chile entered the debt crisis with high levels of private debt which was then reduced with a series of debt-
for-equity swaps. The low spreads of Chilean debt on the secondary market in the early 1990s were probably
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Table 2: Secondary Market Prices of Syndicated Loans
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Argentina 66 35 21 13 21 32 43
Brazil 75 46 40 22
Chile 67 61 57 59 73.3 90 90 90 95
Colombia 84 63 58 64 64 75 75 85 90
Ecuador 65 37 13 14 19.8 22 28 52
Mexico 56 50 43 36
Panama 67 35 20 12 13 21 29 53 53
Peru 18 7 5 6 4 11 19 67 56
Venezuela 74 57 41 34
Source: Klingen, Weder di Mauro, and Zettelmeyer (2013)
this market response signaled that the various Colombian arrangements were “excessively”
creditor friendly. As consequence, members of the opposition suggested that Colombia should
ask for outright rescheduling, with conditions similar to those applied to other countries in
the region. However, the Colombian authorities insisted that their chosen strategy “offered
better prospects for a subsequent return to voluntary lending” (Cline, 1995, p 281, Garay,
1989). In his description of Colombia’s external debt management in the 1980s, Luis Jorge
Garay (Colombia’s chief debt negotiators at the time) mentions more than 50 times that the
country wanted to maintain its reputation of “good debtor” (Garay, 1991). The Colombian
authorities were thus disappointed by the fact that their efforts to act as good debtor did not
grant them a better treatment. According to Garay (1991) (own translation):
in accordance with its exceptional status of good debtor country, the international
financial system should have given Colombia a more favorable treatment, reward-
ing Colombia by differentiating it from other countries with payment problems
would have set a clear precedent (page 18)....the commercial banks should be crit-
icized for not having given better recognition to a good debtor in the midst of a
generalized debt crisis (page 29).
While Colombia needed external support, the Colombian authorities considered an IMF
program not politically viable. Due to disagreement on IMF conditionality in past programs,
in 1967 Colombia had decided to remain independent from the Fund (Junguito, 1985, p.
75).30 The Fund was nevertheless involved in negotiations. Colombia’s largest creditor was
the World Bank, and World Bank’s lending to Colombia was monitored in part by the IMF
with a “shadow program” (Boughton, 2001). Moreover, in order to disburse the funds of the
four arrangements described in Table 1, private creditors’ “advisory” committees requested
associated with these low post-swap levels of external debt and with the country’s reputation for being the top
reformer in Latin America.
30Steiner (1991) points out that countries that adopted more confrontational approaches to debt restructuring
ended up having to accept more intrusive conditions from the international financial institutions.
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to be granted access to IMF Article IV staff reports and that Colombia should be subject to a
form of IMF “enhanced” surveillance in which the Fund would certify and monitor Colombia’s
adjustment program exactly as if a stand-by arrangement were in place.31
Given its unprecedented nature, this enhanced surveillance agreement with which the
Colombian “authorities wanted to have the Fund’s Executive Board’s and not just the staff’s
‘seal of approval’ without the stigma that might be associated with a formal stand-by-
arrangement” (Boughton, 2001, p. 413) was met with reservations by most members of
the IMF Executive Board. Until the last minute, the Colombian authorities doubted that
the IMF Board would approve this unusual arrangement (Junguito, 1985, p. 76). However,
the arrangement was approved thanks to strong support from the US Federal Reserve and
from both the IMF Managing Director and the US Executive Director Charles Dallara. The
declassified minutes of an IMF Board meeting that took place on July 26, 1985 report that:
For cases such that of Colombia, when the Board was asked to make a judgment
about an arrangement that had no precise precedent, Mr Dallara said, the Fund
ought to develop new techniques only with considerable caution and with aware-
ness of potential risks and benefits. Appropriately, the Fund has never been called
an excessively innovative institution, but it had devoted great care and caution
in examining the Colombian economy, and the benefits outnumbered the risks. . .
Under the circumstances it was appropriate for the Fund to accept and perform
the proposed monitoring role. (IMF, 1985 p. 32)
This high-level political support from the United States was partly a reward for cooperat-
ing on drug traffic control, and partly due to the fact that the Reagan administration worried
about declining support among traditionally friendly nations in Latin America (Goodsell,
1983). It was, however, the US Federal Reserve that played a key role in supporting Colom-
bia’s preferred approach. The Colombian authorities were in constant contact with the Fed,
whose Chairman, Paul Volcker, wanted to make the point that the US was not using a one-
size-fits-all approach towards Latin America’s debt problems. The Colombian authorities’
determination to be a “good debtor” (Garay, 1991) made Colombia an excellent candidate
for a more favorable treatment. With this objective in mind, Volcker and his staff engaged
with the World Bank President, the IMF Managing Director, and the US Treasury from the
early stages of the crisis and convinced them to support the novel approach favored by the
Colombian authorities (Junguito, 1985, p. 56, p. 73, and p. 77).32
The “Hercules” arrangement lasted until 1994. However, by 1992 Colombia had regained
market access and could take advantage of decreasing global interest rates by issuing dollar
31The basic elements of the concept of enhanced surveillance were put in place in 1985 when Mexico and the
IMF agreed that, after the expiration of the EFF arrangement, the Fund would review every two years the
Mexican economy and inform creditor banks about the outcome of these reviews (Boughton, 2001, p. 368).
32In July 1986, Paul Volcker received the Cruz de Boyaca, one of the highest honors granted by Colombia.
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bonds to repay World Bank loans that carried higher interest rates. By mid-1993, the sec-
ondary market discount on Colombia’s loans had dropped dramatically and the Colombian
authorities became worried about excessive private inflows. In order to slow down these in-
flows, Colombia imposed restrictions on private sector foreign borrowing in September 1993
and then tightened these restrictions twice in 1994. The 1980s debt crisis was over.
4 Estimating Colombia’s Default Probability
Our archival research shows that Colombia’s fundamentals were similar to those of the Latin
American countries that defaulted on their debts. In this Section, we probe further by formally
testing whether in the 1980s Colombia’s default probability was significantly different from
that of other Latin American countries.
Following previous research that scrutinized a large set of economic variables in order to
find those that are associated with the likelihood of observing a sovereign default (Manasse,
Schimmelpfennig, and Roubini, 2003 and Manasse and Roubini, 2009), we proceed in two
steps. In the first, we use the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) model
to select a parsimonious set of variables which are good predictors of the probability of default.
In the second step, we estimate a logit model with the selected variables in order to predict
Colombia’s default probability and to compare it with the estimated probability of default of
Latin American countries in the year in which these countries actually defaulted.
Our raw data cover 87 countries over the period 1976-2017 and include 77 default episodes.
The sources of all macroeconomic and debt data are different vintages of the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators and International Debt Statics.33 Data on default episodes are
based on the updated version of the online dataset by Asonuma and Trebesch (2016). When
a country has several consecutive restructurings, as it was common in Latin America in the
1980s, we only keep the first episode (i.e., the year in which the default spell starts) and drop
all years in which the country is in default until the “decisive” restructuring that ends the
default spell (Reinhart and Trebesch, 2016).
We start with a set of 22 candidate variables which provide different measures of solvency,
liquidity, domestic and external volatility, macroeconomic performance, and political and in-
stitutional quality (see Manasse, Schimmelpfennig, and Roubini, 2003, Manasse and Roubini,
2009, Fioramanti, 2008, and Savona and Vezzoli, 2015). Table A6 in the Appendix lists all
the variables that we use, together with their summary statistics.
LASSO is a variable selection algorithm which is commonly used in machine learning
33We use different vintages of the World Bank data because recent versions do not report external debt data for
countries that have graduated to high-income status (for instance, Chile and Uruguay).
17
(Park and Casella, 2008; Tibshirani, 1996). The LASSO-logit estimator is defined as:








where βL is the vector of parameters to be estimated, y is the dependent variable, X is a
matrix of controls, and λ|β| is a penalty scalar to the maximization problem.
The penalty helps selecting a parsimonious specification of the model by assigning a zero
coefficient to the redundant components of X. The hyper-parameter λ determines the size
of the penalty. Setting λ = 0 is equivalent to estimating a simple logit model (no variable
is excluded from the model) and setting λ = ∞ forces all coefficients to zero. Choosing a
“good” value of λ is thus a critical step in estimating a LASSO model. A standard technique
for choosing λ is k-fold cross-validation. This approach is designed to improve the out-of-
sample properties of the model. The data are divided into k sub-samples of similar size. In
turn, each group (test set) is set apart and not used for estimation, while the remaining k-1
groups are used for estimation (the training set) and employed to evaluate the model predictive
capabilities on the test set. After repeating the procedure k times, LASSO selects the value of
λ that maximizes the cross-validated log-likelihood (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2009;
Goeman, 2010).
We apply this methodology by using a standard 5-fold cross-validation and using as can-
didates the lagged values of the 22 variables listed in Appendix Table A6. After selecting
λ, the routine implements a logistic LASSO for variable selection and then it computes a
logit estimation retaining only the selected variable to predict the probability of observing an
episode of sovereign default.
The cross-validation procedure determines an optimal value of λ = 0.356 and the LASSO
estimator selects the 17 variables listed in Appendix Table A7. While most of the variables
are not individually statistically significant, the estimates in Table A7 show that high in-
terest payments on external debt and large current account deficits are the best predictors
of sovereign defaults. Note that we focus on prediction and we do not make any claim of
causality.
We then use the logit estimates of Table A7 to compare the predicted default probabil-
ities in the year of default for countries that actually defaulted with the predicted default
probability for Colombia in the 1980s. The first row of Table 3 reports summary statistics
for all defaulters included in our sample. The average estimated probability of default in the
year of default was close to 16.5%, with a median value of approximately 6.6%. The data
show that there is a large variance in the estimated probability of default. The country at the
10th percentile of the distribution had an estimated probability of default of only 1% in the
year of default, and the country at the 90th percentile of the distribution had an estimated
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probability of default of about 35%. The standard deviation is nearly 23%.
The second row of Table 3 focuses on all default episodes in Latin America and the
Caribbean and shows average and median estimated probabilities of default which are slightly
higher than those for the full sample of defaulters. In this case, we also see a much larger range
of default probabilities, with the episode at the 90th percentile having an estimated default
probability greater than 80%. The bottom row of the table summarizes the estimated default
probabilities for Latin American defaults over 1980-85. In this sub-sample, the estimated
probabilities of default were even larger, with a mean of 26.5% and a median value close to
20%.
Table 3: Estimated Probability of Defaults for Actual Defaulters
Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max p10 p90
All Defaulters 16.58 6.61 22.76 0.16 99.47 1.01 35.04
LAC Defaulters 20.74 7.38 27.98 0.67 99.47 0.93 81.78
LAC Defaulters 1980-85 26.45 19.59 31.01 0.93 99.47 3.58 81.78
Note: This table summarizes the estimated probability of default for the countries that did default and in the
year of the actual default. The estimated probability are based on the Logit model of Table A7.
Figure 1 plots the estimated probabilities of default (with 95% confidence intervals) for
Colombia over the period 1979-86 and compares them with the mean and median values
reported in Table 3. Consistently with the historical narrative of Section 3, we find a sudden
increase in the probability of default in 1983, with the predicted probability of default varying
from 3% in 1982 to 14% in 1983 (as we use lagged explanatory variables, this result implies
that the predictors of default increased in 1982) and then ranging between 14% and 20% over
1984-86. The figure also shows that, between 1983 and 1986, the estimated probability of
default for Colombia was never significantly lower than the mean and median values reported
in Table 3. In fact, in 1983, 1984, and 1986 the estimated probability of default for Colombia
was significantly higher than the median value for all defaulting countries in the year in which
they did default.
Figure 2 reports predicted default probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals) for Latin
American and Caribbean countries that defaulted in the 1980s, always evaluated in the year
of the actual default. It shows that the predicted default probabilities in Panama, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Dominican Republic were significantly lower than pre-
dicted default probabilities in Colombia for the period 1983-86 and that predicted default
probabilities in Venezuela, Jamaica, Mexico, Argentina, and Peru were not significantly dif-
ferent from those of Colombia. Only Brazil and Chile show predicted default probabilities
which were significantly higher than those of Colombia in the years 1983-86.34
34Edwards (2004) found that the estimated probability of default for Colombia in 1980 was higher than that of
Argentina and within 2 percentage points that of most Latin American countries that defaulted in the 1980s.
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Figure 1: Predicted Probability of a Colombian Default
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Note: The graph plots the predicted probability of a Colombian default (with a 95% confidence interval) over
1979-86. The dashed lines plot the average and median predicted probabilities of default (measured in the year
of the actual default) for all Latin American countries that defaulted in the 1980s and for all defaulters in our
sample.
5 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, we study whether Colombia enjoyed short-run benefits by not defaulting in
the 1980s. To build a counterfactual, we employ two techniques, namely the synthetic control
method (SCM) (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) and the synthetic difference-in-differences
method (SDID) (Arkhangelsky, Athey, Hirshberg, Imbens, and Wager, 2020). SDID is a
generalization of the standard SCM which further improves identification by accounting for
unobservable time-invariant factors and common shocks. We start by providing a brief de-
scription of these approaches.
5.1 Synthetic Control
The SCM is a data-driven procedure that allows estimating causal effects by building coun-
terfactual outcomes for observational units that are subject to a treatment (Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003). Unlike a standard difference-in-difference estimation that considers a
simple average of the control units, the SCM relies on a weighted average of the control ob-
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Note: The graph plots the predicted probability of default (with a 95% confidence interval) in the year of the
actual default. The dashed lines plot the predicted probabilities of default for Colombia in 1983 and 1986.
servations (Athey and Imbens, 2017).35 In our context, the treatment refers to a “non-event”,
namely the non-default of Colombia.36
In a set of Latin American countries j = 1, . . . , N over T periods, Colombia (country 1) is
the only country that receives the treatment in period T0, since all other countries in the region
did experience a default event. For a given value of the non-default indicator NDj ∈ {0, 1}
and values of an outcome Yi,t, we define potential outcomes Yj,t(NDj) as follows:
Yj,t(NDj) =
Yj,t(0) if NDj = 0Yj,t(1) if NDj = 1 (2)
Clearly, we do not observe Colombia in both states: while Y1,t(1) is observable for Colom-
bia, Y1,t(0) is not observable. However, the SCM builds a counterfactual for Colombia, i.e. the
outcome of interest in the absence of the NDj treatment. Concretely, it finds the weighted
average of all potential comparison units which best mimics the treated outcome during the
35For recent applications of this methodology in a macro context see Cavallo, Galiani, Noy, and Pantano (2013),
Caselli (2017), Freund, Mulabdic, and Ruta (2019), and Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti (2019), among others.
36For the estimation of a non-event with synthetic control see also Born, Dietrich, and Muller (2020).
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pre-treatment period based on the idea that a combination of units that were not subject to
the treatment (donor pool) may approximate the characteristics of the treated unit signifi-
cantly better than any control unit alone.
Given a vector of weights W = (w2, ..., wn+1), the synthetic control estimators of Y1,t(0)






τ̂1,t = Y1,t(1)− Ŷ1,t(0) (4)
To conduct inference on the synthetic control estimates, we follow Firpo and Possebom
(2018) who propose a placebo test-based approach to compute confidence intervals. Building
on the permutation test framework described by Imbens and Rubin (2015), this method
extends and formalizes the original inference procedure suggested by Abadie, Diamond, and
Hainmueller (2010) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015). Firpo and Possebom
(2018) also show the validity of this method in small samples, making it particularly suitable
for our analysis.37
The approach works as follows: first, we run permutations (placebos) by re-assigning the
treatment to one of the control countries in each iteration. This means that we proceed as if
each of the countries in the donor pool was treated by a non-default episode. Second, for each
j 6= 1 country, we compute a test statistic that corresponds to the ratio of the mean squared




(Yj,t − Ŷj,t(0))2)/(T − T0)∑T0
t=0 (Yj,t − Ŷj,t(0))2/T0
(5)
where T0 is the time of the treatment. Intuitively, this is the ratio of the post-treatment to the
pre-treatment mean squared prediction errors. By taking the ratio between the two RMSPEs,
we avoid discarding countries with poor pre-treatment fit. Finally, we invert the test statistic
given by the RMSPEj to compute the confidence sets.
38
We build counterfactuals for real GDP, inflation, exports, and imports (see Table A8 for
definitions and sources). We choose 1981 as treatment date as it precedes the beginning of
37While Firpo and Possebom (2018) interpret this test as a Fisher randomization test, Abadie, Diamond, and
Hainmueller (2015) interpret it as a placebo test that does not require randomization for validity. Firpo and
Possebom (2018) also extend the Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) methodology to test any kind of
sharp null hypothesis beyond the simplest null hypothesis on no-effect.
38While considering the properties of five different test statistics, Firpo and Possebom (2018) conclude that the
RMSPE, proposed by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015) is the best performer. They suggest that, in
a context with only one treated unit, synthetic control estimator should be used even if the treatment were
randomly assigned.
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the Latin American crisis in 1982 (see Section 3). We exclude Bolivia and Jamaica from
the donor pool as they defaulted before 1981 (Table A1).39 We estimate the effect of non–
defaulting up to 1985 to limit the possibility that other shocks might confound the SCM
estimates. As a baseline and to avoid to ‘cherry-picking’ the set of predictors in the SCM, we
choose to match the pre-treatment outcomes of interest on their lagged values only, with no
additional controls (for a discussion see Doudchenko and Imbens, 2016 and Ferman, Pinto,
and Possebom, 2020).40
Depending on the variable considered, different countries carry higher weights in the con-
struction of the counterfactual (Table 4). Mexico has the highest weight in the models for
GDP, inflation and exports, and Panama has the highest weight in the model for imports.
Brazil, Costa Rica, and Venezuela also have relatively high weights in more than one model.
In general, the weights are relatively sparse as often happens with synthetic control estimators
(see Abadie, 2020 for a technical discussion).
We assess goodness of fit with the ratio of the pre-treatment RMSPE and the RMSPE
obtained with a model with zero fit defined as in Adhikari and Alm (2016).41 If the RMSPEj
is 0, then the ratio index is equal to zero, indicating a perfect fit. A ratio index equal to one
suggests that the RMSPEj is identical to the zero fit model.
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows that the ratio to the benchmark RMSPE is close to
zero across all models, suggesting that our synthetic control performs well in approximating
the pre-treatment dynamics of the variables considered.
Figure 3 plots the realizations of the four variables of interest (the solid lines) together
with the SCM counterfactuals (the dashed lines). The figure confirms the good fit already
illustrated in Table 4. For all variables that we consider, the SCM builds weighted averages
of the countries in the donor pool that closely track the behavior of Colombia before 1981.
The top left panel of Figure 3 focuses on GDP. Our estimated counterfactual indicates that,
under default, Colombia would have observed a slow-down in GDP growth of approximately
1 percentage point per year over the period 1981-85. This effect is about half the size of what
it is normally found in cross-country regressions (Borensztein and Panizza, 2009). The top
right panel describes the counterfactual for inflation and indicates that a default would have
led to a spike of inflation, with inflation peaking at nearly 80% in the counterfactual, against
an actual value of approximately 20%.
The bottom panels of Figure 3 describe the two main components of the current account:
39Excluding units subject to similar policies in the pre-treatment period is important to select a meaningful
donor pool (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2015).
40If the number of pre-intervention periods in the data is sufficiently large, matching on pre-intervention outcomes
allows controlling for heterogeneous responses to multiple unobserved factors. The intuition is that only units
that are similar along both observable and unobservable dimensions would follow a similar trajectory during
the pre-treatment phase and thus receive positive weights by the SCM (Cunningham, 2021).





2 where 11 corresponds to the number of pre-treatment years.
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Table 4: Country Weights and Goodness of Fit
Log of GDP Inflation Log of Export Log of Import
ARG 0.038 0.008 0.000 0.000
BRA 0.126 0.000 0.149 0.000
CHL 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.278
CRI 0.231 0.000 0.482 0.000
DOM 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.000
ECU 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000
MEX 0.276 0.711 0.365 0.032
PAN 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.391
PER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
URY 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.169
VEN 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.130
Pre-treatment RMSPE 0.006 2.194 0.094 0.058
Ratio to benchamark RMSPE 0.000 0.013 0.003 0.004
Note: This table reports the country-specific weights for each of the four models. The last two rows report
the Pre-treatment RMSPE and its ratio to the benchmark fit RMSPE. A value of zero indicates a perfect
fit.
exports and imports. They indicate that a default would have led to higher exports (about
26% higher over a 4-year period) and lower imports (about 36% lower over a 4-year period).42
Taken together these results suggest that, if it had defaulted, Colombia would have experi-
enced a positive trade balance of about 10% over 1982-85, instead of an actual small trade
deficit of about 1%. Our findings are in line with the idea that, by being creditor friendly,
Colombia managed to finance a small current account deficit escaping the need of a sudden
current account reversal which is often one of the most severe consequences of a financial
crisis (Milesi Ferretti and Razin, 2000, Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia, 2004, and Edwards, 2004,
among others).
Figure 4 shows the estimated treatment effect (i.e., the difference between the solid and
dashed lines in Figure 3) together with 90% confidence bands. The estimated effects are
statistically significant at most horizons for GDP, inflation, and exports, but are not statisti-
cally significant for imports. In this latter case the estimated effect is large but imprecisely
estimated with very wide confidence bands.
42The effect on imports is unlikely to be driven by reduced trade credit as Alvarez and Flores Zendejas (2014)
show that access to trade credit for Colombia was not different from access to trade credit for countries that
defaulted and had an IMF program. The fact that Colombia did not have a major devaluation like the other
countries in the sample may have instead played an important role.
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Figure 3: Effect of non-defaulting on Colombia macroeconomic conditions
(a) Log of real GDP (b) Inflation
(c) Log of Export (d) Log of Import
Note: This figure reports Colombia’s synthetic controls (dashed line) and the actual series (solid line) for the
log of GDP, inflation, the log of export and import. The treatment year is 1981. The synthetic estimate is
based on the baseline model which includes all the pre-treatment outcomes as covariates.
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Figure 4: Effect of non-defaulting on Colombia macroeconomic conditions – Inference
(a) Log of real GDP (b) Inflation
(c) Log of Export (d) Log of Import
Note: This figure reports the difference between Colombia’s actual series (the solid lines in Figure 3) and the
synthetic control (the dashed lines in Figure 3) for the log of GDP a inflation, the log of export and import.
The vertical spikes are 90% confidence bands.
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5.2 Synthetic Difference-in-Difference
One issue with the standard synthetic control estimator described above is that it does not
allow controlling for unobserved heterogeneity through the inclusion of country and time fixed
effects. This is problematic for our analysis because there might be unobserved variables which
are jointly correlated with the probability of default and the macroeconomic outcomes that
we study. Arkhangelsky, Athey, Hirshberg, Imbens, and Wager (2020) propose a synthetic
difference-in-difference (SDID) estimator that combines synthetic control and difference-in-
differences (DID) to exploit the advantages of both methodologies. Similarly to SCM, SDID
stregthens the plausibility of the parallel trend assumption by re-weighting and matching pre-
treatment trends. Similarly to DID, it allows controlling for country and time fixed effects.
Another desirable property of the SDID approach is that it provides a double-robustness
property to the estimator because it employs fixed effects in modelling the outcome variables
and also applies weights to the control units. As long as one of these two balancing approaches
is effective, SDID produces unbiased estimates even in situations in which the other balancing
approach is not correct.
As in the SCM, weights for the control units ω̂j are first estimated to match pre-treatment
trends in the outcome of the treated unit. Time weights λ̂t are also estimated to achieve
balance in pre-treatment time periods (λ̂t = 0 in the SCM).
43 The SDID estimator can then
be written as:
(









(Yj,t − µ− αj − βt −NDjτ1,t)2 ω̂j λ̂t
}
(6)
Unit weights are included to ensure that the average outcome for the treated unit is
parallel to the average outcome for the control units. However, the difference between treated
and controls varies over time in the pre-treatment period. To take this into consideration,
time weights adjust for the pre-treatment difference that is predictive of the outcomes in the
outcomes in the post-treated period.
As before, we focus on GDP, inflation, exports, and imports and show that the SDID
estimations corroborate the SCM results described in the previous subsection.
Given that SDID includes fixed effects, the actual and counterfactual series are not sup-
posed to overlap in the pre-treatment period and the graphs reported in Figure 5 are slightly
more difficult to interpret than the simple SCM of Figure 3. Specifically, Figure 5 includes
four lines: (i) the actual value of the variable of interest (the solid black line); (ii) the syn-
thetic control (the solid blue line); (iii) the actual trend (the dashed black line); and (iv) the
counterfactual trend (the dashed blue line).44 The red brackets show the treatment effect
43See Arkhangelsky, Athey, Hirshberg, Imbens, and Wager (2020) for details on the estimation of the time
weights.
44The point where both trends start (dashed lines) is determined by the weighted average (using the time
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which is given by the distance between the actual trend and the trend that we would have
observed if Colombia had defaulted. Finally, the triangles describe the time weights λt.
The top left panel of Figure 5 shows an accumulated GDP effect of about 4% over a four-
year period, which is basically identical to what we found in the SCM estimations of Figure
3. With respect to inflation (top right panel) we find an accumulated effect of nearly 27%
which is lower than the 41% effect found in the SCM estimations, but still very large. The
bottom panels of the Figure corroborate our previous finding of a positive effect of exports
(36% in the SCM estimations and 32% in the SDID estimations) and a negative effect on
imports (26% in both the SCM and the SDID estimations).
Figure 5: Effect of non-defaulting on Colombia macroeconomic conditions – Synthetic
Difference-in-Difference
(a) Log of real GDP (b) Inflation
(c) Log of Export (d) Log of Import
Note: This figure reports Colombia’s synthetic controls (grey solid line) and the actual series (black solid line)
for the log of real GDP, inflation, the log of export and import. The black dashed line corresponds to the trend
in the observed series, while the blue dashed line reports the trend we would have observed under a default.
The pink areas represent the time weights λt. The treatment year is 1981. The synthetic control estimates are
based on a SDID model that includes all the pre-treatment outcomes as covariates and country and year fixed
effects.
weights) of the pre-treatment outcome variable and the pre-treatment years. The end of the dashed lines in
the post-treatment period is obtained by averaging the post treatment outcomes and years.
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6 Reputation
Sovereign debt models in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) assume that debtors’ de-
sire to preserve reputation in the international capital market is the main driver of willingness
to repay (Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer, 2009).
The results of the empirical literature that tests for these reputational effects are mixed,
however. Several authors find that the reputational effects of sovereign defaults are either short
lived or small (see, among others, Eichengreen and Portes, 1986, Borensztein and Panizza,
2009, Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris, 2011). Cruces and Trebesch (2013) show that, although
these results hold for the average defaulter, the reputational costs of default are increasing
with the haircut imposed on creditors. Catão and Mano (2017), on the contrary, find a that all
defaulters pay a large and long-lived default premium, irrespective of the size of the haircut.
These contrasting results may be partly explained by the variety of episodes included in the
different studies. Moreover, a common problem with these analyses is endogeneity: there may
be unobserved variables (for example measures of political instability) which are positively
correlated with both sovereign spreads and the likelihood of a default.45
We saw that the Colombian authorities in the 1980s shared the Eaton and Gersovitz
view that defaulting would have had large negative reputational effects (Garay, 1989). As
a consequence, in discussions with IMF staff and within the domestic policy debate, they
maintained that avoiding an outright rescheduling with terms comparable to those offered to
other countries in Latin America would allow for a quick return to normal access to capital
markets (see Section 3).
Cline (1995) suggests that this strategy paid off: when Colombia received its first credit
rating in 1993, it was rated as investment grade by Standard & Poor’s and only one notch
below investment grade by Moody’s (Table 5). This argument, however, does not prove
causality because we do not observe the rating that Colombia would have been assigned if
Colombia had defaulted. For instance, Chile, which did default in the 1980s, received higher
credit ratings by both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. Mexico, another defaulter, was
rated just one notch below Colombia by both agencies. Primary market yield spreads for
unenhanced international bonds issued in the first half of the 1990s paint a similar picture.
The yields of Colombian bonds were lower than those of Argentina and Venezuela bonds, but
close to those of Mexico and Uruguay and higher than Chilean yields (Table 6), all countries
that defaulted in the 1980s.46
Again, these comparisons suffer from the endogeneity problem mentioned above because
differences in ratings and yields may be associated with unobservable differences in funda-
mentals. In this section, we conduct an event study aimed at testing whether long-term
45This positive correlation imparts an upward bias to the estimated effect of a default on the interest spreads.
46Like Colombia, Chile did not participate in the Brady’s exchange. However, Chile did reschedule its debts
under the Baker plan and it is usually classified as a defaulter (see Tables A1 and A2).
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Table 5: Foreign Currency Credit Ratings for Latin American Borrowers
1993 1994 1995
Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P
Argentina B1 BB- B1 BB- B1 BB-
Brazil B2 NR B2 NR B1 B
Chile Baa3 BBB Baa2 BBB+ Baa1 BBB+
Colombia Ba1 BBB- Ba1 BBB- Ba1 BBB-
Mexico Ba2 BB+ Ba2 BB+ Ba2 BB
Trinidad and Tobago Ba2 Ba2 Ba2
Uruguay Ba1 BB+ Ba1 BB+
Venezuela Ba1 BB Ba2 BB- Ba2 B+
Source: IMF (1993), Table 9 and IMF (1995b), Table 6. Investment grade issuers in bold
Table 6: Yield Spreads at Launch for Unenhanced USD International Bonds
Issued by Latin American Sovereigns
1991 1992 1993 1994
Argentina 375 324 301 250
Chile 150 150
Colombia 215 153
Mexico 201 215 208
Uruguay 275 228 158
Venezuela 235 386
Source: IMF (1995a), Table A6 and IMF (1995b), Table A8
reputational effects are at play during a crisis period, when presumably they should matter
the most. For this purpose, we look at the sudden stop which followed the Russian default of
August 1998.
In the early 1990s, several Latin American countries started experiencing large capital
inflows. After a short-lived reversal in the aftermath of the 1995 “Tequila” crisis, and an even
shorter inflow reversal in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in the summer of 1997,
capital inflows to the region kept growing at a rapid pace. By mid-1998 about one-quarter of
total investment (or nearly 6% of GDP) of the region’s seven largest economies was financed
by foreign capital (Calvo and Talvi, 2005). The sudden stop episode that followed the Russian
default put an abrupt end to these flows. The financial shock was enormous: flows to the
largest seven Latin American economies fell from $100 billion over the period 1997Q3-1998Q2
to $37billion in 1998Q3-1999Q2, while average sovereign yield spreads in the region tripled
(Calvo and Talvi, 2005).47
The fact that the crisis occurred in a country that represented less than 1% of global
output and that had no significant economic ties with Latin America (Calvo, 2004) allows us
to treat this event as an exogenous financial shock from the point of view of Latin American
47Baig and Goldfajn (2001) study the effect of the Russian shock on Brazil and provide detailed chronology of
the Russian crisis.
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countries.48 We exploit this fact and use an event study framework to test if the reputation
accumulated by Colombia during the 1980s made Colombia more resilient to this shock (note
that we cannot conduct similar experiments for the Tequila and Asian crises because data on
Colombian spreads are only available from mid-1997).
There are two dates that mark the explosion of the Russian crisis: the crash of the Russian
stock market on Thursday August 13, 1998 and, on Monday August 17, the decision of
the Russian authorities to devalue the ruble, default on the domestic debt, and declare a
moratorium on payments to foreign creditors.



























































































































































Note: Argentina: dashed grey line; Brazil: solid grey line; Colombia: thick black line; Mexico: dashed black
line; Peru: thin solid black line. The two vertical lines are for August 13, 1998 (drop in Russian asset prices)
and August 17, 1998 (Russian default). The figure does not include Chile because the country was not part of
the EMBI index in 1998.
Figure 6 plots the evolution of EMBI spreads for Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru
for a sixty-day window around these two events (marked by the vertical lines). Before the
Russian default, the Colombian spread stood at about 450 basis points, 150-200 points lower
than the spreads of Argentina, Mexico, and Peru (which ranged between 600 and 650) and
about 400 points lower than the Brazilian spread (Chile was not part of the EMBI in mid-
48There are now strong financial ties between Russia and Venezuela, but they were built by president Chavez
who was elected in December 1998.
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1998). Latin American spreads did not react to the stock market crash in Russia of August
13, but started climbing rapidly after the Russian default of August 17.
Figure 6 shows that Colombia was not spared from financial contagion. In fact, the
Colombian spread started increasing more rapidly than the Mexican and Peruvian spreads. By
early September, Colombian, Mexican and Peruvian spreads were basically identical, hovering
at around 900 basis points, and then peaking at over 1000 basis points on September 11, 1998.
Things did not improve thereafter. Two months after the Russian shock, Colombia had also
lost its advantage relative to Argentina. By mid-October 1998, the Argentinean, Colombian,
Mexican, and Peruvian spreads were in the 850-900 basis points range, with Brazilian spreads
remaining above 1300 basis points. One full year after the Russian default, in August 1999,
the Colombian spread was still above 650 basis point, slightly higher than the Mexican and
Peruvian spreads and about 100 basis point lower than the Argentinean spread (notably, it
was nearly 400 basis points higher than the Chilean spread).49
To formally test whether Colombia was relatively more resilient to the Russian shock, we
conduct an event study (MacKinlay, 1997). This consists of a two-step procedure. First,
we estimate the relationship between the changes of Colombian and “market” spreads in the
period leading to the Russian crisis. Second, we use the estimated parameters to predict
Colombian spreads during the crisis event and compare them with observed ones. Significant
difference between predicted and actual spreads would flag “abnormal” changes during the
crisis.
We start by regressing daily changes in Colombian EMBI spreads (SCt) on daily changes
in “market” spreads (SMt) over an estimation window that precedes the event:
∆SCt = α+ β∆SMt + εt (7)
To estimate Equation (7), we must decide the length of the estimation window, and provide
a definition of “market” spread.50 In our baseline estimates, we use a 90-day estimation
window ending 4 days before the event. Our results are robust to using 60 and 120-day
windows. Note that there are two possible dates for the event we are interested in: August
13, 1998 and August 17, 1998. To minimize potential effects from the collapse of asset prices
occurring on the first date, in the baseline we close the estimation window 4 days before the
first event. Our results are robust to ending our estimation window 4 days before the second
event.
With respect to the choice of a “market” spread, in the baseline we use the first principal
49Chile was included in the EMBI index in May 1999 (JPMorgan, 1999).
50While we focus on changes in spread, the literature tends to focus on daily returns, with the standard equation
taking the form of RCt = α+ βRMt + εt. Where Rt = ln(Pt/Pt−1) and P is an asset price. Given the inverse
relationship between bond yields and bond prices, in our case, the two formulations are equivalent but with
opposite interpretation of the results.
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factor of changes in Argentinean, Brazilian, Mexican, and Peruvian spreads. Our results are
robust to using the first and second principal factors of all seven Latin American countries
which were included in the EMBI index during 1998 (the four countries mentioned above plus
Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela).
Table A5 in the Appendix shows the results for different estimation windows and defini-
tions of the “market” spread. Daily changes in the Colombian spread are closely correlated
with changes in the “market” spread under all reported specifications. However, only the first
principal factor enters significantly in the regression.
In the second step, we use the coefficients estimated in step one to predict the changes
in spreads during the event window and obtain excess (“abnormal”) changes in spreads as
out-of-sample forecast error (i.e., we subtract the predicted values from the actual changes
during the event window). Finally, we compute accumulated abnormal spreads by adding the
excess spreads over time during the event window.
Defining the excess change in spread as A∆S = ∆SCt − α̂ − β̂∆SMt , and denoting the





Note that a positive value of CA∆S indicates that the actual interest rate premium of
a sovereign bond during the crisis episode exceeds the premium predicted by Equation (7).
Thus, a positive value means that during the crisis period the country is doing worse than
what can be predicted by the behavior of the “market.”
Recall from Figure 6 that Latin American spreads started to rise rapidly only after August
17. For this reason, we build our baseline crisis window around this date. With respect to the
length of the event window, in the baseline we use a 6-day window (starting the day before
the event and ending 4 days after the event). We obtain similar results when we use a 12-day
window, starting the day before the event and ending 10 days after.
To test if our measure of excess spreads is significantly different from zero, note that the




A∆S is the variance
of abnormal spreads during the estimation window), so that the t statistic for the average





The result of these tests, for the different time windows, comparison groups, and number
of factors used, are described in Table 7. We always find that average accumulated abnormal
spreads are positive, implying that Colombia was actually doing worse than the other countries
that had defaulted in the 1980’s. They are also statistically significant in 11 out of the 12
specifications reported in Table 7.51
51The only case in which they are not statistically significant is when we use 2 factors and a 6-day window.
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Table 7: Colombian Abnormal Spreads After the Russian Default.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
6-day event window
Av. Abn. Spreads 6.43** 9.13*** 8.69*** 9.98*** 5.56** 1.83
(2.38) (3.89) (3.61) (4.52) (2.39) (0.79)
12-day event window
Av. Abn. Spreads 8.40*** 10.57*** 10.23*** 11.21*** 9.23*** 7.45***
(6.20) (9.01) (8.51) (10.16) (7.94) (6.44)
Estimation Window
N. Days 90 90 120 60 90 90
Ending on Aug. 9 Aug. 13 Aug. 9 Aug. 9 Aug. 9 Aug. 9
N. of princ. factors 1 1 1 1 1 2
Countries used for ARG, BRA, MEX, PER ARG, BRA, MEX, PER
Market spreads PAN, PER, VEN
Abnormal returns t-test in parenthesis, ** statistically significant at 5% confidence level, *** statistically
significant at 1% confidence level
The formal tests of Table 7 confirm the visual impression obtained from Figure 6: at the
time of the Russian default the reputational advantage that Colombia had possibly gained by
not defaulting a decade earlier had evaporated.
In his description of the management of Colombia’s external debt in the 1980s, Garay
(1991) writes that only in the medium and long run people will be able to evaluate if the
reputational gains were worth the short-run sacrifices associated with this strategy. Our
results suggest that reputational gains were not long-lived.52
7 Conclusions
This paper uses a novel approach to address a classic question in international finance: why
do countries repay their debts in the absence of strong enforcement of creditors’ rights? The
economic literature has suggested that, given that countries cannot be forced to pay, they will
only do so if the costs of not paying are higher than the short-run gains. Hence, asking why
countries repay is equivalent to asking what are the costs of sovereign default.
The existing literature studied the costs of default by analyzing the effects of different
default indicators on some outcome variable (mostly sovereign spreads, access to the inter-
national capital market, and GDP growth). We take the opposite approach: rather than
asking what are the costs of default, we study the benefits of repaying at time of widespread
sovereign default. We focus on the case of Colombia, the only large Latin American country
52One key issue is whether reputation adheres to a country, to a country’s political institutions, or to a particular
government. All of these are subject to change, albeit at very different paces. If reputation is entrusted to a
specific government, it is not surprising that the gains of the 1980s were no longer at play in 1998. However,
standard models take the view that the country, and its political institutions, rather than a specific government,
are the object of trust. For example it is common to refer to countries who experienced many default episodes
over the decades as“serial defaulters” (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 2003).
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that did not default in the 1980s, and complement archival research with formal econometric
analysis.
We show that in terms of economic fundamentals, Colombia in the early 1980s was similar
its neighboring defaulting countries and that Colombia’s estimated probability of default was
not significantly different from that of the Latin American countries that defaulted in the
1980s. Archival research points to the fact that main differences were political in nature. On
the one hand, the Colombian authorities had a clear desire to maintain a good relationship
with its creditors in order to enjoy the reputation of a “good debtor (Garay, 1989). On the
other hand, they were able to avoid a formal restructuring agreement within an IMF program
thanks to strong political support from the US administration and the US Federal Reserve.
The case of Colombia turns out to be much more complicated than what it is usually
thought. The literature classifies Colombia as a non-defaulter. Yet, the country had four
rounds of debt rescheduling, with conditions which were only slightly more favorable to credi-
tors than the conditions applied by other Latin American countries that are normally classified
as defaulters. We document that, as a result, Colombia’s syndicated bank loans were trading
in the secondary market at a large discount. The main difference with other defaulting Latin
American countries was that, as mentioned, Colombia managed to reprofile its debts while
avoiding an official debt rescheduling within an IMF program.
When we apply econometric techniques to estimate the causal effect of this decision, we find
clear evidence of significant short-term benefits in terms of higher GDP growth, lower inflation
and a smoother current account adjustment. However, our analysis finds that Colombia did
not enjoy long-term benefits in terms of better access to international capital markets at time
of crisis.
Taken together, our results support the view that default episodes should not be treated
as binary events (Meyer, Reinhart, and Trebesch, 2019) and that more research is needed in
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(1991): El Manejo de la Deuda Externa de Colombia. Bogotá: Fondo Editorial
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Fedesarrollo.
42
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8 Appendix
Table A1: List of Sovereign Defaults in the 1980s
East Asia Middle East North Africa
Philippines 1983 Iraq 1987
Vietnam 1985 Jordan 1989
Europe Morocco 1983
Poland 1981 Yemen 1985
Romania 1981 Sub-Saharan Africa
Turkey 1982 Angola 1985
Yugoslavia 1983 Burkina Faso 1983
Latin America & Caribbean Cabo Verde 1981
Argentina 1982 Cameroon 1985
Bolivia 1980 Centra African Rep. 1981
Brazil 1983 Cote d’Ivoire 1983
Chile 1983 Gabon 1986
Costa Rica 1983 Gambia 1986
Cuba 1983 Ghana 1987
Dominican Republic 1982 Guinea 1986
Ecuador 1982 Guinea-Bissau 1983
El Salvador 1983 Liberia 1987
Guatemala 1985 Madagascar 1981
Haiti 1982 Malawi 1982
Honduras 1981 Mozambique 1980
Jamaica 1981 Niger 1983
Mexico 1982 Nigeria 1982
Nicaragua 1980 Sao Tome & Principe 1987
Panama 1983 Senegal 1981
Paraguay 1986 Sierra Leone 1983
Peru 1983 South Africa 1985
Trinidad and Tobago 1988 Tanzania 1984
Uruguay 1983 Togo 1982
Venezuela 1983 Uganda 1980
Zambia 1983
Source: Borensztein and Panizza (2009) and Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch (2012). In the case of multiple
restructurings, only the first default is listed.
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Table A2: Selected Bank Debt Restructuring in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country year Type Grace Period Maturity Spread over
(years) (years) LIBOR (bps)
Argentina 1983 New financing 3 4.5 213-225
1984 Restructuring 3 10-12 137
1984 New financing 3 10 125-163
Brazil 1983 Restructuring 2.5 8 200-225
1983 New financing 2.5 8 188-212
1984 Restructuring 5 9 175-200
1984 New financing 5 9 175-200
1986 Restructuring 5 7 113
Chile 1983 New financing 4 7 212-225
1983 Restructuring 4 8 200-212
1984 New financing 5 9 150-175
1985 Restructuring 6 10 138
1985 New financing 5 10 125-162
Costa Rica 1983 Restructuring 3.25 6.5-7.5 213-225
1985 Restructuring 3 10 163
Dominican Republic 1983 Restructuring 1 5 213-225
1985 Restructuring 3 13 138
Ecuador 1983 Restructuring 1 7 213-225
1983 New financing 1.5 6 225-237
1984 Restructuring 3 12 138
1984 New financing 2 10 125-162
Jamaica 1984 Restructuring 2 5 250
1985 Restructuring 3 10 188
Mexico 1983 Restructuring 4 8 175-188
1983 New financing 3 6 213-225
1984 New financing 5.5 10 113-125
1984 Restructuring 0-1 14 88-125
1986 Restructuring 7 20 81
1986 New money 5 12 81
1986 New money 7 12 81
1986 New money 4 8 81
Uruguay 1983 Restructuring 2 6 213-225
1983 New financing 2 6 213-225
1986 Restructuring 3 12 138
1986 Restructuring 3 12 163


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A4: Evolution of Selected Economic Variables in Colombia
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Debt Service 15.1 15.3 28 29.9 38 40.3 46 38.5 43.1 46.9 47.3 43.8
(% of exp.)
Govt bal. -1.2 -2.5 -6.4 -7.6 -7.6 -6.3 -3.5 -0.3 -0.5 -1.5 -1.6 -0.9
(% of GDP)
Intl. res. 4.1 5.4 5.6 4.9 3.3 1.7 1.3 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.7 4.5
(Bill. USD)
Curr. acc. bal. 2 0.4 -6.1 -10.1 -9.8 -7.6 1.6 -0.2 -0.7 -0.4 1.4
(% of GDP)
Sources: Colombia Recent Economic Developments reports 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993, Colombia
Article IV reports, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989. Using always the most recent information published in the reports.
Table A5: Colombian EMBI Spreads and “Market” Spreads
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
F1 11.38*** 13.06*** 11.84*** 12.47*** 11.73*** 10.71***
(1.93) (1.87) (1.95) (2.12) (1.89) (1.96)
F2 3.468
(4.50)
Constant 0.827 1.108 0.791 0.768 0.769 0.936
(0.61) (0.71) (0.60) (0.61) (0.54) (0.70)
N. Obs 90 90 90 90 120 60
R2 0.28 0.36 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.34
Window length 90 days 90 days 90 days 90 days 120 days 60 days
Window ends on Aug. 9 Aug. 13 Aug. 9 Aug. 9 Aug. 9 Aug. 9
Countries used for market returns ARG, BRA ARG, BRA, ECU, MEX ARG, BRA
MEX, PER PAN, PER, VEN MEX, PER
Standard errors in parenthesis. *** statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. F1 and F2 represents
the first and second principal factors of the changes in EMBI spreads of the countries listed in the table.
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Table A6: Variables used in the LASSO-Logit, Summary Statistics
Mean Median St. Dev Min Max p10 p90
Broad money growth (%) 46.46 16.41 363.20 -88.79 12,513 3.73 46.76
Inflation, GDP defl. (%) 50.91 7.86 605.36 -29.69 26,766 0.80 35.50
GDP growth (%) 3.73 4.16 5.55 -51.03 106.28 -1.88 8.77
GDP per capita growth (%) 1.74 2.10 5.38 -50.23 91.65 -3.89 6.96
Short-term debt (% of ext. debt) 12.06 9.52 11.10 0.00 83.15 0.65 26.02
Domestic Absorption (% of GDP) 107.72 105.30 15.68 55.86 161.43 94.26 122.66
Int. on ext. debt (% of Exp.) 6.92 4.92 6.77 0.08 69.81 1.04 15.19
Int. on ext. debt (% of GDP) 2.01 1.37 2.77 0.01 78.97 0.29 4.25
Int. on long-term debt (% of GDP) 1.49 1.08 1.70 0.00 51.49 0.18 3.23
Int. on PNG ext. debt (% of GDP) 0.23 0.02 0.46 0.00 5.61 0.00 0.66
Int. on PPG ext. debt (% of GDP) 1.27 0.84 1.59 0.00 51.49 0.14 2.82
Int. on short-term debt (% of GDP) 0.27 0.12 0.55 0.00 12.69 0.00 0.65
Total debt service (% of exports) 17.93 14.46 14.49 0.12 156.86 3.08 36.49
Total debt service (% of GDP) 5.24 3.96 6.00 0.00 135.38 0.79 10.56
Current acc. bal. (% of GDP) -4.34 -3.57 8.93 -80.05 62.30 -13.53 3.73
Trade (% of GDP) 71.33 63.05 37.71 0.17 311.36 31.65 122.86
Exports (% of GDP) 31.60 27.64 18.20 0.10 127.56 11.53 55.50
Imports (% of GDP) 39.73 34.40 22.50 0.07 236.39 17.31 68.88
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 3.13 1.67 7.11 -82.89 159.72 0.03 7.30
Ext. debt stock, PPG (% of GDP) 47.89 32.57 59.85 0.00 862.11 9.97 95.75
Ext. debt stock, PNG (% of GDP) 5.03 0.62 11.34 0.00 160.64 0.00 13.82
Debt forgiveness (% of GDP) 0.64 0.00 3.77 -0.98 93.51 0.00 0.77
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Table A7: The Drivers of the Probability of Default, Logit model
Variables (all lagged) Coefficients and Standard Errors
Broad money growth (%) -0.008
(0.008)
GDP growth (%) 0.101
(0.197)
GDP per capita growth (%) -0.193
(0.203)
Short-term debt (% of external debt) -0.022
(0.023)
Domestic Absorption (% of GDP) -0.049***
(0.021)
Interest on external debt (% of exports) 0.133***
(0.039)
Interest on external debt (% of GDP) 0.732
(0.456)
Interest on PNG external debt (% of GDP) -0.084
(1.009)
Interest on PPG external debt (% of GDP) -0.968
(0.585)
Interest on short-term debt (% of GDP) 0.203
(0.605)
Total debt service (% of GDP) 0.042
(0.044)
Current account balance (% of GDP) -0.091***
(0.028)
Exports (% of GDP) 0.031*
(0.017)
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) -0.027
(0.038)
External debt stocks, PPG (% of GDP) 0.007*
(0.004)
External debt stocks, PNG (% of GDP) -0.096
(0.067)






Standard errors in parenthesis. *** statistically significant at the 1% confidence level, ** statistically significant
at the 5% confidence level, * statistically significant at the 10% confidence level.
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Table A8: Sources of Variables for the Counterfactual Exercise
Real GDP GDP at constant 2010 USD World Development Indicators
Inflation CPI annual percent change World Development Indicators
Exports Exports of goods and services (current USD) World Development Indicators
Imports Imports of goods and services (current USD) World Development Indicators
Notes: We fill missing CPI observations for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela with annual inflation
calculated using the GDP deflator obtained from the World Development Indicators.
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